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ABSTRACT 
This paper takes off from Jan Kregel’s paper “Shylock and Hamlet, or Are There Bulls and 
Bears in the Circuit?” (1986), which aimed to remedy shortcomings in most expositions of the 
“circuit approach.” While some “circuitistes” have rejected John Maynard Keynes’s liquidity 
preference theory, Kregel argued that such rejection leaves the relation between money and 
capital asset prices, and thus investment theory, hanging. This paper extends Kregel’s analysis 
to an examination of the role that banks play in the circuit, and argues that banks should be 
modeled as active rather than passive players. This also requires an extension of the circuit 
theory of money, along the lines of the credit and state money approaches of modern Chartalists 
who follow A. Mitchell Innes. Further, we need to take Charles Goodhart’s argument about 
default seriously: agents in the circuit are heterogeneous credit risks. The paper concludes with 
links to the work of French circuitist Alain Parguez. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The title of this piece is a play on the title of Jan Kregel’s paper “Shylock and Hamlet, or Are 
There Bulls and Bears In the Circuit?” (1986), which is appropriate as I am drafting this in 
Copenhagen only a few kilometers from “Elsinor” castle. Of additional relevance is that we 
have just finished a conference at which Alain Parguez gave a masterful presentation of the 
problems with the set-up of the European Union—a topic to which I will turn near the end of 
this chapter.  
I will not replicate in detail the arguments made in Kregel’s article. Briefly, his 
complaint was that the circuit approach is confined to Keynes’ industrial circulation and gives 
short shrift to the financial circulation. Somewhat ironically, I had moved to Bologna in 1986—
a year after his publication—to write my dissertation on the relation between the two spheres of 
circulation, attempting a synthesis between a Circuitiste/Neo-Ricardian view of the industrial 
sphere and a Minskian approach to the financial sphere. Needless to say, that did not go over 
well—and so I moved on to endogenous money as a less controversial topic (Wray 1990). In 
any event, Kregel’s contribution had already made the essential points. In the TOM (Treatise on 
Money), Keynes had the state of bearishness together with the behavior of banks determine the 
price of capital goods (Keynes 1976 [1930]). In the GT (General Theory), bearishness was 
replaced with liquidity preference (Keynes 1964 [1936]). Unfortunately, the “monetary details” 
fell into the background, as Keynes presented a general theory of asset price determination, with 
liquidity preference playing the driving role. As Kregel put it:  
It is thus the ‘bearishness’ or ‘liquidity preference’ theory of the value of capital 
assets that I referred to as the missing Prince of Denmark in the post-Keynesian 
Hamlet. The circuit approach, while it claims to reflect Keynes’ conception of a 
monetary production economy seems to deny the importance of the link between 
monetary factors and the prices of capital goods, between the rate of interest and 
investment; it appears to mistake Shylock for Hamlet (Kregel 1986, p. 16). 
Again, I do not want to rehash the details, but the problem identified by Kregel was an 
inconsistency in the usual Post Keynesian presumption that capital goods prices are determined 
as some exogenous markup over wages. Further, independence of the level of real profit and 
interest rates was assumed, and would require that interest rates do not affect the rate of 
investment. Yet, following Keynes, “When Hamlet plays the Prince, it is impossible to postulate 
a change in the rate of interest without a change in liquidity preference which will change the 
prices of capital assets and thus the investment decisions of entrepreneurs” (Ibid., p. 21). With 3 
 
respect to the two spheres of circulation, this is important because when financial assets offer 
better returns, finance flows away from the industrial circulation. “The financial circulation 
expands at the expense of the industrial circulation. Hamlet walks the ramparts, ‘to invest or not 
to invest’ that is a question that depends on liquidity preferences of entrepreneurs” (Ibid.). Yet, 
“it is a question that is difficult to address if it is presumed that investment is independent of all 
but the willingness of Shylock to create sufficient credit to allow his clients to pay his exorbitant 
rates of interest” (Ibid.).  
To put it as simply as possible, Keynes used liquidity preference theory to determine the 
demand prices for all assets that can be held through time, including capital assets. The 
composition of returns, q-c+l, vary by asset type with demand prices adjusting to equalize 
expected returns to holding them. From this, we get the marginal efficiencies, including the 
marginal efficiency of money (MEM) which acts as the “rooster” setting the standard that all 
other assets must beat. Changes to liquidity preference affect that standard and hence demand 
prices. To be newly produced, the demand price of capital assets must exceed supply prices. It is 
here that, as a rough rule of thumb, we can take the PK markup approach. Since capital assets 
come out of the sphere of production, they must have a supply price—a “cost price” to cover 
production costs plus normal profit. A rise of liquidity preference that raises interest rates hence 
counts twice—once in raising the MEM and again in raising production costs (since interest is a 
cost that must be included in supply price). Following Minsky (1975), we can draw an 
investment “demand curve” (Pk) that is horizontal up to the point that exhausts internal funds; 
beyond that point it slopes down due to borrower’s risk. The “supply curve” (Ps) is also 
horizontal to the same point, then slopes up due to lender’s risk (that includes the stated interest 
charged on borrowed funds). An increase of liquidity preference also counts twice here: 
increasing borrower’s and lender’s risk so that both curves shift inward. In fact, even the 
horizontal portion of the demand curve shifts down—so we could say that liquidity preference 
counts three times.  
A rise of liquidity preference thus increases the MEM and lowers the Pk while raising 
the Ps. This results in less investment, which lowers profits (all else equal) through the Kalecki 
profits equation. In Keynes, the equalization of expected returns is at the point in time that 
decisions are made. There are short-term expectations—which govern decisions made regarding 
use of existing capacity—and long-term expectations which concern the decision to invest. 
Since capital assets are both part of current output (using existing capacity to produce them) and 4 
 
as well are assets that are expected to generate returns in the future, the two different price 
systems come together in the investment decision (again, Pk must exceed Ps, the former coming 
out of the asset price system and the latter coming out of the current output price system).  
As Kregel argued in another famous paper, Keynes adopted three different 
methodological approaches in the GT (Kregel 1976). In the first, he assumed that expectations 
are always fulfilled; in the second, they can be disappointed but do not change expectations; and 
in the third, disappointments lead to changes of expectations. While Minsky’s FIH (financial 
instability hypothesis) would appear to mostly use the last method (optimistic expectations are 
disappointed, leading to “fire sales” of assets and a Fisher debt deflation), he also noted the 
importance of self-fulfilling expectations in both boom and bust—generating a euphoric boom 
or self-reinforcing crash. 
For these reasons, it would be a mistake to leave bulls and bears out of the circuit. I have 
never known what to think of claims by some circuitistes that liquidity preference ought to be 
left out of the analysis—or worse yet, claims that both liquidity preference theory and Minsky’s 
FIH amount to loanable funds theory. Any PK theory of investment must leave room for 
expectations—what else would drive decisions made about purchasing capital goods that will 
last years or even decades?—and out in the real world there are always alternative assets that do 
not require a commitment that is so difficult to unwind should expectations prove to have been 
unwise. Further, it is very hard to believe that lenders do not also have expectations about 
prospective earnings of borrowers, also realizing that failure is possible. Hence it makes sense to 
build in margins of safety—which will be reduced when optimism grows—as well as higher 
lending rates to cover greater lender’s risk. Banks should not be treated as passive lenders—
horizontally supplying loans and deposits on demand, and with firms doing their duty to borrow 
funds, pay wages, and produce output with no regard for the future since profits are 
mechanically generated and assured by Kalecki! 
 
CAN “ANYONE” CREATE MONEY? JUST HOW SPECIAL ARE BANKS? 
The purpose of my contribution is not to review or to critique previous work in this area. Rather, 
what I will do is to explicate a simple extension to Kregel’s paper by linking liquidity 
preference (or bearishness) to Minsky’s claim that “anyone” can create money with the 
paradoxical realization that default is possible. When we add to the mix bears, default, states 5 
 
(state money and lender of last resort), and the universal law of credit, we get much closer to a 
comprehensive approach to money. While the circuit approach deserves credit for focusing on 
the role played by the banker and money creation as a pre-condition to allowing production 
decisions to go forward, ignoring the role played by expectations, uncertainty, and default is 
akin to performing Hamlet without the Prince. 
In what follows, I presume all readers are familiar with the simple circuits and the most 
common extensions—which were developed largely following the pioneering work of Alain 
Parguez and Graziani (1990). 
 
MONEY AS CREDIT-DEBT RELATION 
I find the circuit approach particularly useful for driving home the point that the finance for 
spending must come from somewhere. Most recognize that to finance a purchase one needs to 
use income, to sell an asset, or to borrow. At the individual level, that is certainly true. Yet, the 
“finance” that comes from income flows as well as the receipts from sales of assets also must 
come from somewhere—and an “infinite regress” is not logically compelling. The typical 
neoclassical deus ex machina source of finance is saving—but if saving is in financial form it 
must have been generated by someone else’s spending, another infinite regress. Hence, when 
the circuitiste begins with a bank loan to finance purchase of commodities (to be used to 
produce commodities) all logical problems are resolved.  
Spending and creation of “money” in the form of a bank deposit are linked. It is best to 
think of these as balance sheet entries: the bank accepts the IOU of the borrower and credits her 
demand deposit; the borrower’s IOU is offset by the credit to her deposit. Spending then simply 
shifts the demand deposit to a seller. Money is created “endogenously” to finance spending. 
Later, when loans are repaid, the demand deposit as well as the borrower’s IOU are debited—
money is destroyed. There is no magic involved, no “manna from heaven”, no separation of the 
“real” (say, IS curve) from the “monetary” (LM curve). As Clower would remark, money buys 
goods and goods buy money but goods do not buy goods. Barter is ruled out, as one must first 
obtain money—from income flows, asset sales, or borrowing—before spending. And the money 
must get created with an initiating purchase. 
Of course, all the money gets destroyed only if it is all spent in a manner that allows all 
debtors to retire debt. There can be slips between lips and cups. Two main problems arise: 6 
 
money might get into the wrong hands, and it might not get spent (these are linked). In the 
typical presentation, workers might decide to save some of their wages, meaning that capitalists 
cannot retire loans taken out to pay the wage bill. Bonds can be sold either to workers or to 
banks to allow retirement of the short term loans. Less often considered is the possibility that 
workers do spend all wages but expenditures are not distributed properly among firms to allow 
loan repayment. Again, disappointed firms could sell bonds to firms with windfall sales. That 
unhappy result would not be sustainable for long—and indeed might not even be plausible for 
the shortest run—who wants to buy the debt of a firm that cannot realize revenues through 
sales?  
The possibility for a realization crisis is inherent in the chaos of decentralized decision 
making. (There must be heterogeneous agents in the circuit!) And if the debtor defaults on her 
loan, the bank’s balance sheet takes a loss. In the simplest expositions of the circuit, the bank 
would be toast (like Citibank today!)—it does not have loan loss reserves or equity to withstand 
the hit. If we ignore real world accounting rules, a circuitiste bank can always make the deposits 
“good” since they are mere liabilities—even if all of a bank’s assets drop to zero value, it can 
always provide its own IOUs to its creditors (depositors). But that cannot happen in the real 
world. 
First, there are regulatory or generally accepted accounting rules (RAP or GAAP; or 
even CRAP: creative regulatory accounting principles!), but we will ignore those for now. 
Second, there is a widely recognized pseudo-logical rule that one cannot retire one’s own debt 
by issuing another debt. In the simple circuit, a bank receives its own IOU (deposit) when the 
borrower retires her IOU (loan). But if the borrower defaults, the bank will have IOUs 
outstanding in excess of its assets. Even if all the other assets prove to be good, so that 
borrowers use bank deposits to retire them, there will remain bank liabilities outstanding that 
cannot be retired by repaying loans. In the anarchic unplanned economy, the bank with excess 
outstanding liabilities has no assets to deliver to clear its accounts when deposits are shifted (as 
would occur if the bank’s depositor makes a payment to someone with a deposit in another 
bank). While other banks could simply clear deposits by extending credit to the insolvent bank, 
this, too, is implausible for the simple reason that the bank does not have adequate good assets 
to serve as collateral. This problem can be finessed if there is only one bank—a not entirely 
satisfactory solution. (We need heterogeneous banks, too!) 7 
 
Out in the real world, banks clear accounts using a third party liability—the reserves 
provided by the central bank. The central bank can lend reserves to the bank facing a clearing 
drain—enabling it to clear accounts even where it is insolvent. While a real world central bank 
would act as lender of last resort to allow the deposits to clear, it should quickly move to resolve 
the insolvent bank. Otherwise, it will be throwing “good money” after “bad”—and although its 
claims on the insolvent bank will match its own new liabilities it cannot count on sufficient 
“reflux” as the reserves accumulate in the balances of solvent banks due to adverse clearing 
against the insolvent bank. Like the insolvent bank, the central bank’s money IOUs would not 
be destroyed at the end of any circuit that included insolvent banks. 
 
DEFAULT AND MONEY 
We have, of course, just introduced default risk into the circuit. Goodhart (2008) argues that the 
reason that conventional economics cannot find a role for money or for financial institutions in 
its rigorous (“general equilibrium”) models is because default is ruled out by assumption. All 
IOUs are presumed to be equally safe because all promises are always kept as all debts are 
always paid. (This is the so-called “transversality condition.” Indeed, many such models employ 
a representative agent who is both debtor and creditor and who quite rationally would never 
schizophrenically default on herself. Heterogeneous borrowers are necessary!) This means that 
all can borrow at the risk-free interest rate and that any seller would accept a buyer’s IOU; there 
is no need for cash and never any liquidity constraint. Nor would we need any specialists such 
as banks to assess credit-worthiness, nor deposit insurance, nor a central bank to act as lender of 
last resort.  
Obviously, almost all interesting questions about money, financial institutions, and 
monetary policy are left to the side if we ignore liquidity and default risk. There would be no 
need for a monetary circuit and thus no circuitiste approach. The simple circuitiste circuit is a 
logical impossibility. We must have heterogeneity of banks and borrowers, we must have 
default risk, we must have expectations (bulls and bears), and we must have a central bank. 
Let us turn to the most fundamental question about debt: just what is owed when an IOU 
is issued? All IOUs share one common requirement: the issuer must accept back her own IOU 
when it is presented (Innes 1913; Wray 2004). In the circuit, the bank takes back its own IOU 
(demand deposit) when a debtor presents it to pay off a loan. Another promise that many 8 
 
monetary IOUs carry is convertibility on demand (or on some specified condition such as a 
waiting period) to another monetary IOU or even to a commodity. For example, on a gold 
standard, the government might promise to convert its currency (an IOU stamped on coin or 
paper) to so many ounces of precious metal. Or, a country on a fixed exchange rate might 
promise to convert its currency to so many units of a foreign currency. Banks promise to convert 
their demand deposit IOUs to domestic high powered money (currency or reserves at the central 
bank).  
It is important to remember that a promise to convert is not fundamental to the issue of 
an IOU—it is in a sense voluntary. Indeed, in the simple expositions of the circuit, with one 
bank and no central bank, there is no promise to convert at all. With multiple banks, each can 
promise to convert to the liabilities of others at par. We know that at least in the case of the US, 
before 1913 and the creation of the Fed, bank liabilities did not clear at par. Par clearing is 
ensured by central bank willingness to act as lender of last resort; it is further strengthened by 
government-provided deposit insurance. The first is a mostly short-term assurance that deposits 
clear at par, while the second ensures deposit holders against insolvency of a bank. 
We have just introduced a central bank and government deposit insurance. We need to 
examine the role played by the state in the monetary system. These can make banks “special” by 
reducing or entirely eliminating default risk by banks on their own liabilities. 
 
INTRODUCING THE STATE 
Modern “fiat” currencies on floating exchange rates are accepted with no promise to convert.  
Many attribute this to legal tender laws, where sovereign governments have enacted legislation 
requiring their currencies to be accepted in payments. On the other hand, the Euro paper 
currency makes no promises and has no legal tender laws requiring its use. Further, throughout 
history there are many examples of governments that passed legal tender laws, but still could 
not create a demand for their currencies.  (See Wray 1998, Goodhart 1998, and Knapp 1973 
[1924].) Hence, there are currencies that readily circulate without any legal tender laws (such as 
the Euro) as well as currencies that were shunned even with legal tender laws.  
If currency cannot be exchanged for precious metal in many countries, and if legal 
tender laws are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure acceptance of a currency, and if the 
government’s “promise to pay” really amounts to nothing (except exchanging its currency for its 9 
 
currency), then why would anyone accept a government’s currency? As followers of the “taxes 
drive money” approach have emphasized, it is because the sovereign government has the 
authority to levy and collect taxes (and other payments made to government including fees and 
fines). Tax obligations are levied in the national money of account—dollars in the US, Canada, 
and Australia.  
Further, the sovereign government also determines what can be delivered to satisfy the 
tax obligation. In all modern nations, it is the government’s own currency (technically, high 
powered money that includes coins, notes, and central bank reserves—for convenience I will 
call these “currency”) that is accepted in payment of taxes. While taxpayers write checks drawn 
on private banks to pay taxes, actually, when government receives these checks it debits the 
reserves of the private banks—reserves that are the central bank’s IOU. Effectively, private 
banks intermediate between taxpayers and government, making payment in currency and 
reserves on behalf of the taxpayers. Once the banks have made these payments, the taxpayer has 
fulfilled her obligation, so the tax liability is eliminated. 
We conclude that government’s “fiat” currency is accepted because it is the main thing 
(and usually the only thing) accepted by government in payment of taxes. It is true, of course, 
that government currency can be used for other purposes: currency can be used to make 
purchases, to settle debts, or to save in “piggy banks.” However, these other uses of currency 
derive from government’s willingness to accept its currency in tax payments. Ultimately, it is 
because anyone with tax obligations can use currency to eliminate these liabilities that 
government currency is in demand, and thus can be used in purchases or in payment of private 
obligations.  
For this reason, neither reserves of precious metals (or foreign currencies) nor legal 
tender laws are necessary to ensure acceptance of the government’s currency. We conclude that 
taxes drive money. The government first creates a money of account (the Dollar, the Pound, the 
Euro), and then imposes tax obligations in that national money of account. In all modern nations 
this is sufficient to ensure that many (indeed, most) debts, assets, and prices, will also be 
denominated in the national money of account. The government is then able to issue a currency 
that is also denominated in the same money of account, so long as it accepts its currency in tax 
payment. It “spends” this currency into existence, and destroys it by accepting it at government 
pay offices. 10 
 
This gets us part way to an explanation of why money IOUs are almost without 
exception denominated in some state’s money of account. The sovereign power chooses the 
money of account when it imposes a tax liability in that unit. Keynes also recognized the state’s 
role in choosing the money of account when he argued that the state  
comes in first of all as the authority of law which enforces the payment of the 
thing which corresponds to the name or description in the contracts. But it comes 
in doubly when, in addition, it claims the right to determine and declare what 
thing corresponds to the name, and to vary its declaration from time to time—
when, that is to say, it claims the right to re-edit the dictionary. This right is 
claimed by all modern states and has been so claimed for some four thousand 
years at least (Keynes 1976 [1930],  vol. 1, p. 4). 
 (This is why I ironically titled my book Understanding Modern Money in the sense that it 
applied only to the last “four thousand years at least”—whatever might have happened previous 
to that may not be “modern money.” We will probably never know.)  
Enforceability of monetary contracts in court is part of the reason nongovernment money 
IOUs are written in the state’s money of account. In addition, money IOUs are often made 
convertible to the state’s IOUs—high powered money. This can make them more acceptable.  
Here’s the problem, however: merely agreeing to accept your own IOU in payment is a 
relatively easy promise to keep. But promising to convert your IOU to another entity’s IOU 
(especially on demand and at a fixed exchange rate—which is necessary for par clearing in a 
money of account) is more difficult. It requires that one either maintain a reserve of the other 
entity’s IOUs, or that it have easy access to those IOUs when required to do the conversion. 
Failure to meet the promise of conversion is a default. Hence, there is additional default risk that 
arises from a promise to convert, to be weighed against the enhancement to an IOU’s general 
acceptability.  
 
REVISITING LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE 
This gives rise to the concept of liquidity: how quickly can an asset be converted with little loss 
of value? Generally, the most liquid asset is the state’s own IOUs (the state promises to convert 
its IOUs to its own IOUs, and to accept those in all payments due to the state), so the conversion 
of other liabilities is often to HPM. Banks hold some HPM so that they can meet demands for 
conversion, but it is access to deposit insurance as well as to the central bank’s discount window 
that makes the bank’s promise to convert secure. Deposit insurance means the government, 11 
 
itself, will convert the bank liabilities to HPM at par; access to the central bank means that a 
bank can borrow HPM as necessary to cover conversions.  
Here we can refer to the concept of a pyramid of liabilities—IOUs issued by other 
institutions and households are convertible to bank liabilities (Bell 2000; Foley 1989). These 
other entities then work out arrangements that make it more likely that they can meet demands 
for conversion, such as overdraft facilities. Everything is then pyramided on the state’s IOUs—
we can think of that as a leveraging of HPM. 
All promises are not equally valid, however—risk of default varies across the categories 
of IOUs. Above, we briefly addressed another fundamental principle of debts: one cannot pay 
one’s debt using one’s own IOUs. But the sovereign state is special. When the sovereign is 
presented with its own IOU, it promises to exchange that IOU for another of its IOUs, or it 
allows the presenter to “redeem” it in payment of taxes. The state makes its own payments—
including paying off its debts—using its own IOUs. To be sure, the state can retire its 
liabilities—by running a budget surplus—but it does not have to pay them down by using 
another’s IOU. So the sovereign state really is special. So long as it does not promise to convert 
its IOUs on demand to any other IOUs (such as foreign currency) or to precious metal, it can 
never be forced into a situation in which it will default. All other entities must provide a second 
party or third party IOU to retire debt. For most purposes, it will be the liability of a bank that is 
used to make payments on one’s debt if one is not the sovereign. Still, no bank can pay its own 
IOUs by issuing its own IOUs. That is why bank underwriting matters: each bank needs to 
ensure that the value of its assets does not fall below the value of its liabilities. 
Default risk on a bank’s IOUs is small (and nonexistent in the case of government 
guaranteed deposits), hence bank liabilities are widely accepted. Banks specialize in 
underwriting (assessing credit-worthiness of) “borrowers”—those whose IOUs they hold. Not 
only do banks intermediate between government and its taxpayers but they also intermediate by 
accepting borrowers’ IOUs and issuing their own IOUs. (While orthodoxy presents banking as 
intermediation between “savers” and “investors” this is incorrect—what is provided by a 
“saver” is the bank’s IOU, created in the financing of the activities of the “investor.” Investment 
creates saving, just as loans create deposits.) The IOUs they hold generally have higher default 
risk (except in the case of government debt), and are less liquid than the IOUs they issue. For 
this service, they earn profits, in large part determined by their ability to charge a higher interest 
rate on the IOUs they hold than the rate they must pay on their own. Again, the image of a debt 12 
 
pyramid is useful—those lower in the pyramid use the IOUs issued by entities higher in the 
pyramid to make payments and to retire debt. 
This leads us to the interest rate, which, as Keynes said, is a reward for parting with 
liquidity. Since government-issued currency (cash) is the most liquid asset, it does not have to 
pay interest; bank demand deposits can be just as liquid (given government backing as discussed 
above) and for many purposes are even more convenient than cash, so they do not necessarily 
need to pay interest (in some cases, banks charge fees for checking accounts; in others, they do 
pay positive interest—this has to do with regulation and competition, issues we will not 
address). Other IOUs that are less liquid must pay interest to induce wealth-owners to hold 
them. In addition, interest compensates for default risk; this is in addition to the compensation 
for illiquidity of the asset. “Money,” the most liquid asset, sets the standard (all other assets 
must earn a higher return) because it best satisfies the preference for liquidity. The desire for 
liquidity constrains effective demand and results in unemployment because the MEM acts as a 
barrier to activity in the industrial sphere (Keynes 1964 (1936); Davidson 1978). 
We return to Goodhart’s (2008) argument that conventional economics has no room for 
money because there is no default risk in rigorous models. For Keynes, conventional economics 
lacks a plausible theory of money holding precisely because there is no fundamental uncertainty 
in the models, which is necessary to explain why liquidity has value. The two arguments are 
related, and explain why financial institutions are important: they issue liquid IOUs with little 
(or no) default risk. This is the reason why their IOUs are frequently classified as “money,” 
while the money IOUs of others are not. Hence, as  Minsky claimed, “everyone can create 
money;” but he goes on: “the problem is to get it accepted” (Minsky 1986, p. 228). IOUs issued 
by heterogeneous agents are not equally acceptable. 
Banks are special in another way: almost all the assets they hold are purchased by 
issuing IOUs. Typically, a bank has 5-8 percent equity against its assets, meaning that its 
liabilities are equal to 92-95 percent of the value of its assets. This is an extremely high leverage 
ratio (the bank’s asset to capital ratio is from 12.5 to 20). As Minsky (1986) put it, banks finance 
their positions in assets by issuing debt. Without guarantees of access to the central bank (to 
make their liabilities more liquid) and to government insurance (to reduce default risk on their 
liabilities), banks could not operate with such high leverage ratios.  
Finally, IOUs are not just held or presented for payment (of one’s own liability). They 
are also to varying degrees transferable. For example, your neighbor might transfer your sugar 13 
 
IOU—perhaps in payment of some sugar debt--to another neighbor, who could present it to you 
with a demand for sugar. Transferability of your IOU is limited to those who know you well and 
who trust that you are good for the sugar. Again, heterogeneity matters. 
Since “money” is commonly associated with transferability of a debt amongst third 
parties, it is not surprising that government currency as well as bank liabilities are most often 
included in empirical definitions of money. The liabilities of nonfinancial corporations, or 
households, are not usually called money because they do not circulate readily among third 
parties. (Securitization of home mortgage loans—as well as various kinds of insurance plus 
certified credit ratings—made them transferable to some degree.) What the lay person identifies 
as money is usually even narrower, something that can be used in a market as a medium of 
exchange—to buy a commodity. And that, of course, must be a monetary IOU that is highly 
acceptable—a government IOU, a bank IOU, or an IOU closely backed by a bank (such as your 
credit card debt). 
 
BANKERS AS THE CIRCUIT’S “EPHOR”  
It is not surprising that circuitistes chose to begin analysis with banks—Schumpeter’s “ephor of 
capitalism”—who, through the underwriting process, decide which economic activities get 
financed. Ironically, we moved beyond underwriting and beyond banks over the past couple of 
decades, and toward Minsky’s vision that “anyone can create money.” I have heard many PKs 
insist that banks still hold the key because only banks can create “real money,” but this is not 
true. I can undertake economic activity if you will accept my IOU—let us say, to hire you to dig 
holes in my garden. So long as you will work for my IOUs, all is fine and dandy. But you want 
groceries. No problem—so long as the grocer is willing to take your IOU while accepting mine 
as collateral. The grocer, of course, must pay the wholesaler—but again that is no problem since 
your IOUs can be discounted. This is the concept behind financialization of the economy by 
shadow banks. Out in the real world, we’ve reached the “nth” degree—derivatives are about 
$600 trillion, all supporting and supported by global GDP which is miniscule by comparison. It 
is time for the circuitistes to recognize reality. 
This is why Minsky’s insights were so prescient: anyone can create money; the problem 
lies in getting them accepted. Rather than looking to banks to “create money” in Minsky’s 
vision the business of banking is “accepting”—taking an IOU and financing its position in that 14 
 
IOU by issuing its own IOU. This is the essence of financialization—or pyramiding—layers of 
debt that represent commitments of prospective future income flows. It is true that banks play a 
special role in the payments system—a special role owed in part to the government backstop 
(lender of last resort and deposit insurance) which ensures that bank IOUs are convertible to 
government IOUs. Yet accounts can clear without using the central bank’s balance sheet; 
clearing at the central bank can become a “last resort”—maybe only net clearing, maybe not 
even that in normal circumstances. Yet, when the crisis hits, the shadow financial institutions 
find they cannot refinance positions—in other words, they cannot reissue liabilities to cover 
their positions in assets. This is precisely what happened in 2007, when shadow banks—which 
had relied on very short term commercial paper to finance positions in mortgage backed 
securities and other assets—could not refinance. Banking deposits had become a very minor 
part of the “financing” of financial institution positions in “loans.” Unfortunately for the banks, 
the alternative sources they had been using were not guaranteed and hence, when the crisis hit, 
they faced a run.  
The crisis exposed the weakness of taking the circuit model too seriously. Certainly, 
economic activity needs finance, but this is not necessarily through loans but rather through 
“acceptation”—accepting liabilities. And financial institutions need to finance their positions in 
the assets they hold by issuing liabilities, but these are not necessarily deposits. Nor are banks 
the only type of financial institutions capable of financing economic activity. Much of the 
financing activity takes place off the balance sheets of banks. To be sure, moving activity to the 
shadow banks depended on a view of the economy—the belief in Bernanke’s “great 
moderation” helped to promote the view that risk had fallen. Preference for safety and liquidity 
had become outdated. Exactly as Minsky had argued, the “run of good times” in the postwar 
period had changed expectations in a way that diminished the value of liquidity and margins of 
safety. This made the great crash a possible outcome. “It” could happen again. “It” did happen 
again! “It” is still happening! 
 
CONCLUSION 
The circuit approach has proved to be an extremely useful tool for analyzing what Keynes called 
the monetary theory of production. We need to begin analysis of production with finance. 
Money created moves through the circuit from payment of wages back to producers and on to 15 
 
banks to destroy the money. In the simple circuit, default is ignored; extensions do allow for 
saving, which prevents some loans from being repaid, and hence some of the money is not 
destroyed. Bonds can be sold to recapture some of the saving—allowing short term loans to be 
repaid, but that only substitutes longer term debt. This opens an avenue for liquidity preference, 
which determines willingness to give up deposits for bonds. Allowing for default provides 
another path for liquidity preference to enter; if default is uncertain (and not merely 
probabilistic), then a preference for liquid assets can exist.  
We also must allow for a range of financial institutions, all of which “create money” but 
only some of which have access to the central bank and the government insure. This provides 
another opportunity for liquidity preference to matter—these money IOUs are not equally 
acceptable. The state matters doubly: it creates the unit of account in which all money IOUs are 
denominated, and it backstops some portion of those money IOUs to make them more liquid. 
The state enforces its choice by accepting only certain IOUs and only those denominated in its 
own currency of account. It thus uses the monetary system to move a portion of resources to the 
public purpose. A monetary circuit without the state is even worse than Hamlet without the 
Prince. 
Keynes introduced liquidity preference in the investment decision, with liquidity 
preference interpreted as a theory of value. Here is where the bulls and bears matter—when the 
bears dominate, the industrial circulation suffers. Unemployment exists because “men” want the 
moon—raising the MEM to such a level that production of commodities cannot be undertaken.  
In this chapter I have mostly echoed the themes in the paper provided by Alain Parguez 
for this conference. He, too, begins with state money: “money could not exist without a State,” 
with the state’s money serving as the “anchor” for credit (Parquez, Rochon, and Seccareccia 
2012, p. 2). According to Parguez, there are two “Newtonian laws” applying to monetary 
circulation: “the monetary circuit is the ultimate existential condition of the capitalist system” 
and “it cannot exist without the state” (Ibid., p.2). At the center of the system we have the 
“banking system,” which includes private banks and the central bank (Ibid., p. 5). Their 
liabilities are denominated in state currency units. Rather than arguing that money is created “ex 
nihilo,” it is spent into existence—this is what gives it pure extrinsic value. It is never dropped 
by Friedmanian helicopters, but rather its creation motivates resources—workers, “natural” 
resources, and produced commodities are put to use, with money motivating the “production of 
commodities by means of commodities” (Sraffa 1960). Money is required at both the beginning 16 
 
and the end of that production—it mobilizes the resources, but only if “more money” is 
expected at the end. Privately created money is destroyed when loans are repaid; government’s 
money is destroyed when taxes are paid. While private money creation and commodity 
production is constrained by expectations of profits, government money creation is not similarly 
constrained. For that reason, the state can and must play the balancing role, keeping the 
industrial circulation operating at capacity.  
This however, requires floating exchange rates; “the State as master of its currency, 
cannot be obliged to redeem its currency at a fixed price [because] the State would be sharply 
constrained in its ability to spend. Thereby the monetary circuit law imposes a perfectly floating 
exchange rate system” (Parquez, Rochon, and Seccareccia 2012, p. 8). And that is why the 
EMU is a Frankenstein’s monster:  each individual state has essentially adopted a currency 
board arrangement with a fixed exchange rate that constrains fiscal policy. This is why Euro 
nations could not deal with the financial crisis—a crisis that was always inevitable. Their only 
option in the face of recession is austerity—adding fiscal headwinds to the private headwinds. 
What Parguez calls “bad deficits” explode and threaten national insolvency.  
Still there is hope. The crisis provides an opportunity to downsize finance and to take the 
“predator” out of Jamie Galbraith’s Predator State (Ibid., p. 17). Rather than serving in the 
interests of the most rapacious globalized corporations, the state needs to finance public 
investment, education, and research. While difficult, this is possible for all sovereign nations 
that have their own floating currency. But for the EMU, this is currently impossible. European 
states can only be saved by restoring their sovereignty (Ibid., p. 20). This could be done through 
the creation of a “more perfect union;” however, that is not likely—mostly for political, social, 
and cultural reasons. That leaves only dissolution of the union. Greece, Ireland, and Italy are 
currently under tremendous pressure to quit—with France and Germany apparently believing 
they have the upper hand. Yet if any of these countries are forced to leave by the onerous terms 
imposed by the center, the dominoes will fall as markets will run against all the other periphery 
nations. That will leave the center nations without their colonial outposts, so they will turn on 
each other. What began as a great political experiment to ensure the end of European Great 
Wars may actually end in the third violent go-round. 
As Keynes put it: “The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-
Euclidean world who, discovering that in experience straight lines apparently parallel often 
meet, rebuke the lines for not keeping straight—as the only remedy for the unfortunate 17 
 
collisions which are occurring. Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw over the axiom 
of parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry”  (Keynes 1973, p. 366). To make 
progress in our understanding of the monetary economy, we have got to put bulls, bears, and 
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